Ordoliberalism is a German school of economic thought that advocates regulation of the free market economy based on a set of state-imposed rules guaranteed by the economic constitution, to impose a competitive order in society. It proposes an alternative method to pure laissez-faire and stateplanned economy for the better regulation of the market economy, where the goals are the protection of the competitive process and individual freedom. In this paper I submit that ordoliberalism, an indigenous European competition policy, is an adequate economic and analytical tool upon which to base the practice and decision-making of competition law. My aim is twofold: to contribute to the discussion on what ordoliberalism is, in general, and in particular concerning competition policy, and offer a fresh perspective on an ordoliberal-oriented competition policy.
Introduction
Ordoliberal ideas of Wettbewerbsordnung and Wettbewerbsfreiheit -competitive order and freedom to compete -have partially influenced the historical development of the internal market, 1 and EU competition policy. 2 At its core, ordoliberalism (also known as
Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui -Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens

141
tool. Competition law deals with the relationship between the state and the economy, 9 by defining behaviour that due to its pernicious welfare effects undertakings are precluded from entering into. In my view, economic theory has three main functions in competition law: firstly, it serves as the framework of reference for competition policy's design and the laws to be applied; secondly, it enables understanding of the economic consequences of an undertaking's behaviour and welfare effects; 10 and thirdly, it informs the application and interpretation of legal rules to particular economic activities. 11 This context, the application of ordoliberalism to competition policy and law (alone and/or in conjunction with other economic trends) establishes the theoretical framework, goals and guiding principles for determining when conduct jeopardises the economic well-being of society. 12 In other words, the application of ordoliberalism acts as a guiding mechanism for the coherent and consistent design, interpretation and application of competition rules.
The aim of this paper is to promote the understanding of ordoliberalism as a school of thought that can be applied in the design of a coherent competition policy, and to examine its implications. To this end, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the origins and evolution of ordoliberalism and presents its main representatives. Section 3 addresses the core ideas of ordoliberalism as an economic and social philosophy. Section 4 comprises an analysis of ordoliberal perspectives on competition and its conception. In Section 5, I present my proposals for the adoption of a contemporary ordoliberally-oriented competition policy. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a summary of the findings and further suggestions for the future.
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The Birth of Ordoliberalism
Origins
Ordoliberalism originated in late 1920s and early 1930s Germany, a by-product of its time: on the one hand, emerging from the German crisis of 1921-1923, the Great Depression of 1929, the Weimar Republic' failure in 1933, and the Nazi regime's central planning efforts, 13 and, on the other hand, a reaction to the state-planned economy of the Soviet Union at that time.
14 Ordoliberals recognised that, at this period in time, a weak state could be greatly influenced by private economic market power, as represented by industry cartels, thereby eliminating true competition and generating social chaos. 15 For ordoliberals, the concentration of economic power curbs individual economic freedom and dominates the state's decision-making function. Although market power controls society's economic life, the state is controlled by private powers, leading to historical tropes such as serfdom and slavery. 16 Furthermore, ordoliberals rejected the notion of a central planned economy on the grounds that it was inefficient and restricted individual freedom. Accordingly, ordoliberalism became an alternative to laissez-faire and central planning by virtue of promoting the existence of a strong state governing economic activity, as well as nurturing the freedom to compete, enshrined by set rules incorporated into the economic constitution.
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Ordoliberals had two sources of inspiration and opposition: classical liberal theory inspired by Anglo-Saxon economics, and the Germanic influence of the Historical School. 18 As 'liberals', 19 they emphasised individual freedom and protection from the 13 Gerber, 'Constitutionalizing the Economy' (n 2) 25; cf with Somma (n 1) 105, 110-111. For a discussion of Nazism from an ordoliberal perspective, see Michel Foucault and others, interference of public power in the private sphere. However, unlike classic liberals they argued for the control of private economic power. 20 In ordoliberalism, personal and political freedom cannot be achieved spontaneously as unrestrained economic competition would lead to power struggles: a state of Vermachtung (or a self-destructive tendency) would arise in which private market power is abused in contravention to the interests of society. 21 To avoid this, ordoliberalism advocates a strong state that defines the set of economic rules in an institutional framework that directs economic competition. 22 Accordingly, the state acts as a Marktpolizei (market police), imposing rules to establish order and coordinate human actions in the economic sphere 23 by virtue of restraining the abuse of market power and securing competition based on a set of rules that protect individual economic freedom. 24 Consequently, ordoliberalism
proposes a holistic view of orders in society that separates economics from politics,
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and counts on a strong state with clearly prescribed functions defined by law.
From a methodological perspective, ordoliberals' ideas were based on the interaction between economic, political and legal orders in an attempt to translate the classical body of economic theory from the language of economics into the language of legal sciences, in a truly multidisciplinary effort. 26 Such translation in practice, however, has been deemed a 'key failure' of ordoliberalism by Grosskettler as it was not sufficiently or properly done. 27 I do not share this view when it comes to reception of ordoliberal ideas in German and EU competition law. As is illustrated in this paper, certain ordoliberal ideas have been incorporated into legal sources of EU competition law. 
Waves of Ordoliberal Schools of Thought
There is no single approach to ordoliberalism and the term is frequently applied in a rather imprecise manner. In my opinion, this has given rise to misunderstandings regarding the theories that underpin ordoliberalism and over-simplification of the underlying ideas. 29 In an effort to impart some clarity here, I distinguish between three 'waves' of ordoliberal scholars. (w)here the individual is judge of his own satisfaction and also has the most complete knowledge of the goods and services which will promote that satisfaction. Individual satisfaction, however does require taking a view of the distribution of income and wealth and therefore of the possibility that individuals will increase their own satisfaction by transferring resources to the less fortunate, although not in ways which will defeat the basic aim. 68 The social market economic rests on three pillars: i) A competition policy based on the system of Ordnungsökonomie 
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In an attempt to reconcile the concept with classic ordoliberalism, Barry identifies two more main objectives of social market economy:
iv) The provision of welfare measures, and v) Preservation of freedom and autonomy vis-à-vis the state. 
Views on Economic Freedom
Private economic freedom is constituted and enforced by a set of legal rules that to an extent 'define mutually compatible private domains within which individuals are free to act, protected from encroachment by other private law subjects as well as from government intervention'. 78 One of ordoliberalism's pillars is protection from both state intervention and private abuse; 79 threats to economic freedom arise from state intervention and the actions of private actors, such as monopolists or cartel members, who render private individuals dependent on modern private power structures, thereby correlating this concept with competition. 80 In and of itself, protecting economic freedom has inherent economic value, but other non-economic content social considerations are also relevant, which, nevertheless, ought to be protected.
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Additionally, the right to free contracting is also necessary in order for a market economy to function well. 82 However, unrestrained contracting freedom may be abused:
in the creation of cartels or the imposition of contract terms by a dominant undertaking, for example. Economic freedom, 'can also be used to reduce the possibilities of others to act in a way which is conducive to competition, and they may even agree to this on a 
Competition from an Ordoliberal Perspective
Introduction
Ordoliberal economic freedom cannot be understood without the existence of a regulated competitive economic process. Ordoliberals view competition as an instrument by which economic freedom is expressed, and protected from abuse. This section deals with the conception of competition from an ordoliberal perspective, equates freedom with competition as a process, and also features a discussion of the analytical concepts that inform economic freedom.
Ordoliberal competition is a European competition policy, which is distinct from the Harvard, Chicago and Post-Chicago schools. 87 Its main goal is protection of the freedom to compete [Wettbewerbsfreiheit] , rather than achieving perfect or imperfect competition. 88 Ordoliberals propose that general competition policy becomes part of society's economic order, based on competition law, rather than advocating a microeconomic modelling for a case-by-case assessment. 89 This competitive order provides the legal framework within which the pursuit of individual freedom is restricted solely by others' freedom. 90 In stark contrast to the protocol pertaining to industrial organisations and competition economics, ordoliberal scholars did not use the language of mathematics to express their views. Indeed mathematical formulations have been qualified as 'an unfashionable idiom (…) and they may be put forward with missionary zeal which is anathema to "positive" 86 Vanberg (n 31) 176. 87 Akman (n 8) 59. For a short discussion on why ordoliberal competition policy differs from the Chicago School conception of competition, see Möschel (n 39) 147. This also appears to be the view of Van Miert, who remarks 'how much easier it was to convince people of the value of a strong competition policy if one talked the language of the Erhard-style social market economy rather than the language of the Chicago School': Van Miert (n 1). The fact that ordoliberals use non-technical language to express economic ideas does not imply that these concepts are not anchored in economic analysis, far from it.
Although, the notable absence of mathematical language very likely accounts for the historical appeal of ordoliberal ideas to lawyers, and in particular, judges, as they tend to employ a legal language whereby abstract concepts are given interpretation and meaning through teleological interpretation.
Competition as the Focal Point
As far as ordoliberalism is concerned, competition is a necessary consequence of scarcity of goods and it has an indispensable function in terms of coordination and social organisation. 94 The competitive order is deemed the essence of the economy because it enables the system to function effectively. 95 While there is no doubt that the competitive market system is the appropriate tool to be employed in this regard, it is up to the economic constitution to determine the legal terms under which competition is carried implication that the undertaking has improved its competition capacity, and as such is comparable to exclusionary abuses. One of the goals of ordoliberalism is to suppress prevention competition by forcing players to behave in accordance with pre-defined market rules.
A Contemporary View on Ordoliberal Competition Policy
Introduction
I now turn to my suggestions for the understanding and readjustment of a contemporary ordoliberal competition policy based on traditional ordoliberal concepts. This interpretation is made from an analytical, rather than an historical, perspective. 114 Due to the scope of this paper, I discuss the proposals in broad strokes, as these issues can be explored further in future ordoliberal-oriented research.
The Institutional Design of Ordoliberal Competition
An ordoliberal competition law
Ordoliberalism proposes the establishment of an institutional and legal framework for the protection of the competitive process based on three main elements. 117 It is paramount that this competition authority is free from political pressure and private power influence. Thirdly, application of the law to concrete cases should be impartial; in accordance with the appropriate interpretation of the law, and subject to judicial review.
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As part of the 'economic constitution', ordoliberals advocated the creation of a competition law objective, which was achieved in Germany with the 1957 enactment of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, which was in part modelled in line with ordoliberal thinking. 119 The Act continues to be the competition law in force in Germany and, despite being amended on several occasions, still retains its ordoliberal influence.
The main goal of an ordoliberal competition law is the protection of economic freedom, facilitated by ensuring that the competitive process and market structure are not distorted. 120 This entails setting positive and negative limits on the freedom to compete in accordance with the rule of law and the economic constitution. As suggested earlier, such a law should foster performance competition and preclude undertakings from entering into prevention competition, focusing on exclusionary abuses.
Such an instrument was proposed by Böhm during the enactment of the Act Against
Restraints Finally, the law should include an efficiency defence that can be applied for all three 'principles', enabling the competition authority to declare any of the three provisions inapplicable when it comes to precluding specific behaviour or operation on the grounds to be an independent agency with the competence to investigative and sanction breaches of competition law.
128 If the competition authority were under undue influences of the executive power then it will be prone to pressure from political and economic powers that could impede its function as guarantor of the competitive process.
Furthermore, cases should be decided by expert teams that include both lawyers and economists. Lastly, all decisions of the competition body must be subject to appeal at the judiciary level, not before an administrative body.
Protecting Competition and Economic Freedom
Ordoliberal competition policy's goals are the protection of individual economic freedom to compete in the economic sphere and preservation of the competitive order. 129 Protecting the competitive process and parties' economic freedom ensures that authorities were to prohibit conduct otherwise permitted by the economic constitution or if they were to allow it based on economic efficiency considerations but without legal provision. 137 Thus, economic efficiency arguments have to 'fit' the set of rules.
Freedom to compete is limited and secured by rules that preclude or allow specific conducts, which are legally incorporated at a 'constitutional level' (ie having the rank of a law) and which affect how competition policy is formed. Such a hierarchy precludes private parties from bending or renegotiating their content by means of private contracting. 138 At a 'sub-constitutional' level, the competition authority applies the rules:
monitoring, evaluating and sanctioning behaviours of individual actors. The content of these competition rules at a sub-constitutional level is determined by the text of the law and interpretation of the rules. 139 I advocate that in order to effectively secure freedom to compete this interpretation must be teleological. Consequently, competition as a goal is neither void, nor an empty formula but is rather construed through the agreements that polity reaches regarding its legislation, even though this could open the door for some political discretion.
Competition itself as Economically Efficient
Protecting competition is efficient and desirable because it prevents society from playing out competition's prisoner dilemma. The competitive process minimises two risks: cheating and under-competitive choices. Some actors will be tempted to circumvent the market's rules for their own benefit at the expense of the other players. Consequently, the rest will then choose the under-competitive option -a protectionist undertakings to avoid the prisoner's dilemma and punishes agents who deviate from the competitive outcome by cheating.
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Another argument supporting the efficiency of competition as a goal in itself is that freedom to compete would be Pareto-efficient if 'individual decisions have only a negligible influence on the market prices'. 143 Accordingly, market power would be kept in check and there would not be any significant detrimental effect on market prices.
Alternatively, in the absence of truly 'free competition' it would be possible to apply 'competition as if' to guide the behaviour of players (I discuss this concept in detail in section 5.7). 144 However, I find the logic of this argument to be unsatisfactory: in practice, freedom to compete and efficient outcomes will not necessarily coincide, for example, the freedom to compete will be dictated by the adoption of legal rulings that, by their very nature, might be sub-optimal from a welfare perspective. Another example would be that, in order to achieve a more efficient economic outcome, certain trading agreements and practices would be prohibited and, thus, economic freedom would be limited, particularly if the decision to prohibit certain practices is taken ex-post. This touches upon the fundamental issue of informing legal texts with appropriate economic foundations: the essence of modern ordoliberal policy.
These arguments trump claims that protecting competition as a goal is economically unjustified, 145 or that it protects 'inefficient competitors which would conflict with the objective of enhancing welfare', as Akman believed, 146 or that 'ordoliberalism is based on humanist values rather than efficiency or other purely economic concerns', as Gormsen maintained. 147 The criticisms are founded on the (mis)understanding that securing economic freedom does not always coincide with fostering economic efficiency, from either a total or consumer perspective, and protecting inefficient firms. important distinction that ordoliberalism does not promote efficiency as an aim but as a result. The distinction appears to me more dialectical than of any practical importance, as for as long as the competitive process is free, the practical result is economic freedom.
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Control of Market Power
Unrestrained market power, whether public or private, restricts personal economic freedom and corrupts and impairs the political system. On the one hand, private market power was a source of concern during the Weimar Republic (and even before this) when legal cartels were seen as an extrapolation of the freedom of contract, regardless of negative welfare consequences or reduction of competitive freedom to non-members of the cartel. On the other hand, state intervention in economic affairs was pernicious and ordoliberals opposed decisions such as the imposition of trade barriers, subsidies, price controls, and compulsory mediation for labour conflicts. conception.' 152 The contention is that EU competition policy (arguably the Commission's view on EU competition policy) 153 has departed from an ordoliberal approach and a 'more economic approach' has been adopted: once which is less form-based and more economically anchored. For example, Venit holds that the ordoliberal conception is outdated, formalistic, old-fashioned and even utopian. 154 Recently, the 'more economic approach' has also been subject to strong criticism, particularly by Wils, who advocates a more 'form based approach' that can be traced to ordoliberal input. 155 Arguably, on occasion such objections have arisen due to misrepresentations of ordoliberal ideas, or by recourse to the works of Röpke and Müller-Armack (predominantly), authors who advocate more extreme versions of political interventionism; social and distributive concerns, and formalistic approaches to competition policy. However, these ideas are not representative of the majority view among ordoliberals. 156 Furthermore, at times attacks against ordoliberalism result from the less 'economically inclined' teleological interpretation of the law by EU judiciary, which is then confused with ordoliberal ideas, rather than ordoliberalism itself. 157 Ordoliberalism does not reject the application of economic insights to resolve specific cases or improve the quality of legal standards and legislation. Arguments to this effect overlook the fact that ordoliberal competition is part of an institutional economics policy with the aim of achieving societal order based on rules that are imposed to govern the market and not a microeconomic trend of competition economics or industrial organisation, 158 operating at different levels of application.
An ordoliberal conception of competition policy is not incompatible with the 'more economic approach', nor has it disappeared from EU competition policy altogether. An ordoliberally-inspired EU competition policy is not necessarily at odds with a more detailed microeconomic analysis of competition practices or a 'more economic approach'; such an assessment would indeed be overly simplistic. Ordoliberalism does not preclude drawing on expertise to refine competition law decision-making and improve the legal regime. What it does reject is departure from the rule of law by adoption of a case-by-case assessment based purely on welfare considerations employed as a guiding policy instrument, in the absence of more formal or structured rules, which define the economic game. 159 The claim is that a case-by-case assessment based purely on welfare considerations, without regard to general and previous rules, can improve competition and furnish legal uses with a fair degree of predictability. To resolve this apparent contradiction, regarding the merits of a more "economic approach" vs a case-by-case assessment, I propose reconciling ordoliberal competitioninstitutional policy with neo-classical microeconomics, through an understanding of the level of application of these economic tools. An ordoliberal inspired policy shapes and sets the rules of an institutional framework, whereas a neo-classical microeconomic analysis of cases is the concrete application of the competition policy. 163 By distinguishing these levels of application, it is possible to introduce economic efficiency 159 Somewhat similar to this position is the view of Vanberg, who claims that in an ordoliberal-based competition policy, 'competition policy cannot make the right of private law subjects to exercise such freedom contingent on how economic advisors assess the welfare effects in particular instances, and that welfare considerations can have their legitimate place only at the constitutional level where the rules of the economic game are chosen', ibid 27; see also the opinion of Gormsen, where it is stated that ordoliberal competition policy 'is shaped by the rule of law rather than by ad hoc political decisionmaking', in Gormsen (n 2) 334. Therefore, ordoliberalism is compatible with a contemporary competition policy that advocates the use of microeconomic theory to guide the proper application of the law in order to guarantee, as much as is possible, an economically coherent interpretation of the law. The key to such harmonisation lies in distinguishing the different levels at which competition policy and competition cases operate.
'Competition as if'?
Concerning the limitation of the abuse of market power, an ordoliberal concept an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.
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By 'competing as if', undertakings should behave as though they lack market power and consistent with performance competition. 170 According to Gerber, this standard would not require governmental intervention as it is an objectively applicable measure which provides clear answers.
171 From this perspective, the concept of 'competition as if' appears to be formalistic and almost per se.
However, one of the main problems of 'competition as if' is that it is an impractical concept because competition is a 'discovery process' (put in Hayekian terms). 172 The argument is that the competition authority would not invariably be able to determine how competition 'would have been' had parties been deprived of their market power. Furthermore, the idea of 'competition as if' has also been criticised because it arguably contradicts economic freedom and is therefore discordant with core ordoliberal ideas.
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The fundamental aspect of this argument is that 'competition as if' implies that a dominant undertaking ought not to behave 'as if' it had market power and that it bears 'special responsibility' to observe a far higher degree of care than undertakings which lack substantive market power. The argument is that, consequently, this standard would To conclude, I propose that contemporary ordoliberal competition policy should distance itself from the idea of 'competition as if' owing to to its deficiencies, instead clear competitive rules should be set that define which types of behaviour Missbrauchprinzip should encompass.
Formalistic Approach or Case-by-Case Assessment based on Efficiency
Concerns
Ordoliberalism favours imposing negative limits on undertakings' economic freedom by determining certain behaviours that are precluded in principle. In this regard, I propose 173 Gerber, 'Constitutionalizing the Economy' (n 2) 52. pricing, boycotts and loyalty-enhancing rebates. 176 The suggested policy, nevertheless, also rejects a competition policy based on pure 'rule of reason' due to the legal uncertainty it creates, which can be understood as simply deciding on cases based on pure efficiency concerns, according to administrative discretion.
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The main benefits of the two-tier structure are its efficiency and flexibility. Most of the conducts that 'fit' the defined prohibited behaviours will not be pro-competitive and therefore undertakings will have scant interest to claim efficiencies that do not exist.
Those cases will, by and large, be decided swiftly and with a small margin of administrative discretion. Nevertheless, in those few cases in which the conduct may be efficient will not be declared outright as incompatible with the competitive market. The problem facing the form-effect approach is of a practical nature. Competition investigations would demand economic and legal expertise, which would be timeconsuming and therefore costly for both undertakings and society.
Which Welfare Standard?
The EU Commission, and a segment of the literature, 178 advocate adoption of a consumer-welfare standard, based on the understanding that the competitive outcome should be beneficial to consumers. 179 The academic and practical debate regarding whether consumer policy is also the standard adopted by EU law is well known and beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, I discuss the welfare standard that is employed by ordoliberalism.
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The first wave of ordoliberals did not discuss welfare standards in modern economic language. 181 Research shows that an 'aggregated consumer welfare' standard has been embedded in the discourse, particularly in the works of Böhm and Eucken in terms of the concept of Leistungswettbewerb (performance competition). Indeed, according to Böhm, the criterion determining where the line is drawn between permissible and forbidden behaviour is consumer interest. This view is far from universal however, for instance, Akman holds that 'ordoliberal ideas are inconsistent with the "consumer welfare" approach.' 182 In a similar fashion, Gormsen argues that protection of economic freedom and consumer welfare are incompatible and that consumer welfare is not a motivation for economic freedom whatsoever. 183 Other views suggest that ordoliberalism supports total welfare standard 'as the result of a truly competitive process', as Behrens puts it, 184 or that it supports soft total welfare standard and was an influential precedent for the position of the Chicago School in such matters. 185 However, in ordoliberalism, consumer interest is the director of the decisions of economic actors and the justifiable economic interest of any economic activity.
These different positions reveal that ordoliberal 'aggregated consumer welfare' is a compromise between pure consumer welfare standard and full total welfare standard, in accordance with the principle that the consumer's interest should be measured in a medium to long term. 186 This compromise is the result of a balance between consumer protection and protection of competition as a process, which is not entirely successful.
The essence of the compromise is the understanding that, for ordoliberalism, the consumer should not be understood as solely an end consumer in the downstream market but also in relation to other consumers in the competitive process and according to the interest in preserving competition as a desirable process.
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In terms of consumer interest, for Böhm a hallmark of the private law society is that 'not only is the satisfaction of consumer needs well above the average for the members of the wealthy class but also they are offered totally different possibilities of productive activity within society'. 188 He claims that consumer concerns are 'the sole directly justifiable economic interest'. 189 In terms of performance competition
[Leistungswettbewerb], the yardstick for measuring competitive outcome is therefore consumer interest. Leistungswettbewerb describes competition among undertakings that aims for the production of better services and products for consumers. 190 For Vanberg, establishing the Leistungswettbewerb standard implies adopting rules that would put consumer's preferences as the 'ultimate controlling force in the process of production. ' 191 In this regard, as Röpke puts it, market order seeks to ensure 'that the only road to business success is through the narrow gate of better performance in service of the consumer and not through many back doors of unfair and subversive competition'.
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On the other hand, the ordoliberal construct argues for an aggregated view because the aim is protection of the competitive process, this in turn implies concern for the wellbeing of the competitive structures and balancing gains and losses across all parties. 193 A focus which is exclusively rooted in short-term consumer welfare may well lead to a 'disproportionate focus on the selling side of the market and an under appreciation' of other competitive risks, such as buyer power, which is at odds with the protection of the freedom to compete.
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In my view, the implication of this rationale is that pure consumer welfare standard is not consistent with ordoliberalism. In addition to the wellbeing of end consumers, it is necessary to take the interest of all consumers in the production chain into account, as well as the medium and long-term consequences affecting the competitive structure both upstream and downstream. A similar posture to this compromised approach was recently suggested by Kirkwood, who argues that:
the purpose of antitrust law -of competition law -is to combat conduct that both diminishes competition and reduces consumer welfare. For this reason, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is best described as protecting 'consumers from anticompetitive conduct -conduct that creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers to producers, and fails to provide consumers with compensating benefits'.
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This compromise implies that behaviours impacting the competitive structure upstream and downstream that are not necessarily directly detrimental to end consumers in the short-run could still endanger the competitive process. Should this be the case then the ordoliberal welfare approach argues that such conduct does indeed warrant competition intervention, even in the absence of short-term detriment to consumer conditions. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have analysed and revisited the main concepts and ideas espoused by ordoliberalism as a social and economic policy, which applies competition law as one of the main instruments in the pursuit of the protection of individual freedom and of freedom to compete. Additionally, I embarked upon the rather ambitious task of proposing reinterpretation of ordoliberal ideas to align them with the development of EU competition policy as an economic analytical framework that guides the interpretation and application of competition law.
As this paper shows, ordoliberalism is neither out-dated, nor is it an extinct trend of guide decision-making regarding cases and, more importantly, suggesting changes to current legal standards and legal interpretations by the courts). Ordoliberalism adopts an interdisciplinary approach by virtue of its nature, and also because such a position results from interpretation that takes into account the goals of the legislation and the economic circumstances of each case.
In addition, ordoliberalism is a well-suited analytical tool for EU competition policy due to two main factors. Firstly, it provides an indigenous European perspective when it comes to designing a coherent competition policy that is in line with goals of European integration; a system based on the social market economy, protection of the competitive process and the European economic constitution. Secondly, ordoliberal ideas, have historically and conceptually, been highly influential in terms of EU competition rules and their interpretation by the EU judiciary. These factors justify the need to re-open the debate regarding whether or not ordoliberal ideas are shaping and/or should continue to shape, the future of the EU's competition policy.
